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Abstract
This article has sought to examine the criminal justice system’s interactions with victims of  crime. It is a
relationship which has changed irrevocably over time. A significant discontinuity occurred in the nineteenth
century when a new architecture of  criminal and penal semiotics slowly emerged. An institutional way of
knowing interpersonal conflict crystallised, one which reified system relations over personal experiences. It
also emphasised new ideals and values such as proportionality, legalism, procedural rationality, equality and
uniformity. New commitments, discourses and practices came to the fore in the criminal justice network. In
modernity, the problem of  criminal wrongdoing became a rationalised domain of  action, a site which actively
distrusted and excluded ‘non-objective’ truth claims. The state, the law, the accused and the public interest
became the principal claims-makers within this institutional and normative arrangement, an arrangement
which would dominate criminal and penal relations for the next 150 years. In the last 40 years, the victim
has slowly re-emerged as a stakeholder in the criminal process.
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This article will examine the changing role of  victims of  crime in the Irish criminalprocess. Their status has not remained static over time. Rather it has been subject to a
series of  ruptures which have dramatically altered their standing. Under the pre-modern
exculpatory justice system which existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where
wrongdoing was understood as a personal altercation, victims were given primacy as
decision-makers. Their ownership of  the alleged wrongs meant that their voices – built
largely upon subjective experiences – carried a powerful justificatory force. By the mid-
nineteenth century, however, the justice system was steadfastly disassociating itself  from
local and personal determinants. It sought instead to become a more depersonalised, rule-
governed affair with the state at the centre. Conflicts were no longer viewed as the property
of  the parties most directly affected. New imperatives were foregrounded within the
criminal justice system, particularly those that emphasised procedure, the ideological
neutrality and rationality of  the process, and its objectivated nature. In the last 40 years, the
criminal justice system has again been changing, moving away from the operational self-
enclosure that dominated institutional arrangements under a state-accused model of  justice. 
The purpose of  this article is to trace the epistemic shifts in the ways in which the
justice system has depicted and signified the victim. Engaging in such a wide-ranging
historical analysis of  the institutional status of  the victim is of  course fraught with
dangers. Lawyers who attempt to understand criminal legal method through the prism of
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history often fall into the fallacy of  creating linear lines of  development between the past
and the present. Such lines facilitate neat reassuring narratives of  continuity, but they
often make for poor, uncritical history.1 Tracing such changes also necessarily involves
sweeping generalisations about changes in social life and in the criminal legal structure.
Searching for patterns and trajectories of  the Gemeinschaft and Gesellchaft variety can in
many instances do violence to historically specific particulars and phenomena that do not
fit with the selective frameworks and periodisations adopted. Justice, like most other
routine phenomena, has a fluid rhythm that does not easily or naturally lend itself  to
partition, compartmentalisation and capacious reasoning or inquiry. Formulating concrete
systems of  justice across 300 years of  history necessarily results in some factuality being
ignored or under emphasised. 
There are still very good reasons for engaging in such an exercise as long as it is
remembered that some local particulars might not unerringly conform with the
generalised patterns produced. In particular, it can help us to identify and consider
different trends, tendencies and currents of  reflection that broadly comprise patterns of
action vis-à-vis those who are victims of  crime. It can therefore serve a very useful
heuristic purpose. The intention is that by highlighting the broad historical changes in the
assumptions and realities that governed victim relations under pre-modern exculpatory
and modern inculpatory models of  justice, it will help to amplify the dynamics and
principles that shape and determine our current arrangements.
The victim as the principal claim-maker 
The justice system that existed in Britain and Ireland in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries was exculpatory and localised in nature. The ‘paradigm of  prosecution’ was the
victim of  the crime.2 Victims were the principal investigators of  crime and the key
decision-makers in the prosecution process.3 As Bentham disapprovingly noted: 
The law gives to the party injured, or rather to every prosecutor, a partial power
of  pardon . . . in giving him the choice of  the kind of  action he will commence
. . . The lot of  the offender depends not on the gravity of  his offence but on . .
. the injured party . . . The judge is a puppet in the hands of  any prosecutor.4
Victims could elect not to invoke the law and let the criminal act go unpunished; they
could engage in a personal settlement or private retribution; or, they could prosecute, but
shape the severity of  any criminal charge (capital or non-capital) through their
interpretation of  the facts.5 Conflicts remained the property of  the parties personally
affected and this often involved recourse to informal dispute settlement:6
. . .formal prosecution was the exception; negotiation and informal sanction the
norm. The major courts had no monopoly over punitive sanctions in the
eighteenth century. Indeed, they usually had to content themselves with
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processing a few scraps and particularly tough morsels which those involved in
informal sanctioning processes threw their way or spat out as indigestible, and as
therefore requiring the tougher teeth of  the criminal law.7
If  victims did proceed with a prosecution, it was their energy, for the most part, that
carried the case through the various prosecution stages. Victims engaged in the fact-
finding, gathered witnesses, prepared cases, presented evidence in court as examiners-in-
chief, and bore the costs involved.8 When formal justice was invoked, which was the
exception rather than the rule, it relied heavily on victim and popular participation.
Formal resolution of  grievance remained very much the property of  individual victims or
associations of  victims who monopolised the investigative and prosecutorial functions.
Victims could thus assert primacy as claims-makers. Their ownership of  the alleged
wrongs had a powerful justificatory force, which ensured that their subjective experiences
and personal preferences were received relatively unfiltered, and carried meaningful
weight. The criminal trial itself  was a personal, largely unregulated altercation with the
working assumption that the accused was, in the absence of  exculpation, guilty. This
ensured that the accused was at all times an active, participating trial actor, a vital
‘testimonial resource’ whose self-exculpatory narrative was closely scrutinised by the
judge and local jury in determining culpability. The degree of  culpability itself  was heavily
shaped by moral and local knowledge considerations. Moreover, few restrictions existed
on what could be admitted in trial. Most evidentiary facts which had broad probative
value as regards the offence committed were heard in open court and required defence
rebuttal regardless of  their prejudicial effect on the accused.
A state-accused model of justice
A significant discontinuity occurred in the nineteenth century when a new architecture of
criminal and penal semiotics slowly emerged. An institutional way of  knowing
interpersonal conflict crystallised, one which reified system relations over personal
experiences. It also emphasised new ideals and values such as proportionality, legalism,
procedural rationality, equality and uniformity. New commitments, discourses and
practices came to the fore in the criminal justice network. Prosecutorial practices, for
example, began to focus on more analytic considerations such as the accused’s conduct
rather than his or her character. More mechanical determinants (such as rulebook
formalism) took priority over contextual experiences. The state came to dominate the
crime conflict, positioning itself  as the only legitimate means of  coercion.
Monopolisation of  this kind recalibrated the circuits of  governance, resulting inter alia in
the construction of  l'égalité des armes to rebalance dissymmetries in power relations. 
The ‘incidence of  interruptions’9 were manifold. To begin with, solutions for the
problems of  crime and violence were increasingly rooted through central authority
mechanisms. The era of  victim justice as ‘accommodation’ and theatre was at an end.
Conflicts were no longer viewed as the property of  the parties most directly affected.
Previously strong stakeholder interests such as those of  victims and the local community
were gradually colonised in the course of  the nineteenth century by a state apparatus
which acted for rather than with the public. Subjects increasingly ceded ‘their
authorisations to use coercion to a legal authority that monopolises the means of
legitimate coercion and if  necessary employs these means on their behalf ’.10
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In monopolising the investigative and prosecutorial functions, the state obviously
imbalanced the equilibrium in power relations. Though constituted as a rational being, the
accused in such circumstances was now seen as vulnerable in that he or she was pitted
against the unlimited resources of  the state. In this context, it is not surprising that a
whole corpus of  exclusionary rules and fairness of  procedure rights emerged to ensure
that the accused was afforded the best possible defence against unfair prosecution and
punishment. This was greatly helped by the lawyerisation of  the trial process. Since, and
to paraphrase Stephen, the state was so much stronger than the individual citizen, and was
capable of  inflicting so very much more harm on the individual than the individual could
inflict upon society, it could afford ‘to be generous’.11 The local victim justice system thus
increasingly yielded to a Leviathan criminal justice system that was governed by a new set
of  commitments, priorities and policy choices. 
The prosecutorial system increasingly came to resemble an ‘obstacle course’ where
‘each of  its successive stages is designed to present formidable impediments to carrying
the accused any further along in the process’.12 Common law and statutory rules were
introduced to safeguard those accused of  crime. In time, they also increasingly became
fused with constitutional jurisprudence and, more recently, with human rights
jurisprudence. The institutionalised nature of  these accused rights has ensured that they
cannot be easily ‘trumped’ for collective policy reasons such as security and public
protection.13 They remain very much part of  the topography in the criminal process,
carrying a threshold weight ‘which the government is required to respect case by case,
decision by decision’.14
Moreover, and very much in keeping with the rationalising impulse of  the age, the
personal knowledge and benevolence of  the exculpatory model of  justice seemed
increasingly arbitrary and overly discretionary. The goal became to ‘rout the personal
from the courtroom’15 through establishing a new administrative machinery for
investigating, prosecuting, trying and sentencing for criminal wrongdoing. Gradually the
trial shifted from an intense local ‘kind of  morality play’16 to a more structured affair
which relied on ideals such as proportionality, reason, equality and uniformity, where the
focus was on the actions rather than the character of  the accused. Thus, over the course
of  the nineteenth century the criminal trial jettisoned its amateur, local, personal and
unstructured tendencies. As Wiener suggested:
[R]emoving the personal element from the workings of  the law would, it was
hoped, lower the emotional intensity of  the subject’s relationship to the law. In
the place of  the metaphors of  the family, which encouraged both
unpredictability and excessive release of  the passions by plaintiffs and accused,
the law and its courts were to be imbued with the character of  a market, a
meeting place of  self-contained, self-disciplining individuals rationally pursuing
their own interests under the impersonal arbitration and discipline of  the
unvarying rules of  law. Passionate contest was to be placed in the professional
hands of  lawyers, for whom passion was an instrument of  calculation, and
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confined by the rules of  law, presenting no danger to society. Out of  their
contest, as out of  a noisy but rule-governed marketplace or stock exchange,
justice would emerge.17
This deep commitment to the reception and observation of  unmediated viva voce
testimony was grounded in the need to uphold the integrity of  the adjudicative process
and minimise the risk of  misdecision.18
This new institutional pattern quickly transcended the victim’s interaction with the
crime conflict and reshaped how it was presented, addressed, legitimated and concluded.
Within such a depersonalised, bureaucratised system, the victim was displaced, confined
largely to the bit-part role of  reporting crime and of  adducing evidence in court as a
witness, if  needed at all. The victim’s space for negotiation and participation in pursuing
his or her own interests was thus dismantled by an increasingly State/accused-centred
logic of  action which sought to institutionalise the politics of  pain and disturbing events
within an ‘iron cage’. Bureaucracy, as Weber informs us, ‘develops the more perfectly’, the
more it is ‘dehumanized, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official
business love, hatred, all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements’.19 The
functional and impersonal imperatives of  a modern criminal justice apparatus did not
require the establishment of  ‘contextual’ relations with either the accused or the victim.
Instead, it was increasingly organised around a constitutional state and the
‘institutionalised fiction’ of  the ‘public sphere as the central principle of  its
organisation’,20 both of  which helped to promote the sense of  ‘civilized association’ and
an ‘objectivated’ criminal process.21 The adversarial criminal trial − involving ‘a contest
morphology’ that included oral presentation of  evidence, lawyer-led questioning, cross-
examination by counsel, relative ‘judicial passivity’ during the guilt-determining phase of
the trial, and informational sources secured by both the prosecution and defence –
exemplified this objective representation.22
From being a cornerstone in the regulation of  relations concerning the conflict,
victims increasingly found their individual experiences (such a vital currency in the pursuit
of  justice in the pre-modern era) assimilated into general group will – the public interest.
The latter was validated through the institutional architecture of  a criminal justice system,
whereas the former was increasingly viewed as invalid knowledge given its partiality,
subjectivity, emotiveness and unconstrained dimensions, all of  which were filtered out by
the operations of  a justice system. In the course of  the nineteenth century, the individual
victim’s experience was increasingly rendered as part of  the fiction of  the collective public
interest and packaged and presented in institutional terms. The medium of  the public
interest itself  – though represented as a neutral space for reasoning and dialogue –
emphasised the values and outlooks of  dominant interest groups within the criminal
process, ensuring that there would be little alteration in the status quo. 
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This marked the shift from victim-mediated justice to bureaucratised, state/accused
mediated justice. Crime therefore was no longer viewed as a personal altercation, but a
phenomenon that required an institutional response demarcated from emotive, subjective
and personal references. In creating this ‘buffer zone between system and person [by
establishing a] zone of  indifference’23 between the lived ontological experiences of  the crime
conflict and its effective administration, new imperatives could be foregrounded, particularly
those that emphasised procedure, the ideological neutrality and rationality of  the process,
and its objectivated, reasoned nature. The elevation of  these imperatives to a ‘position of
authority’ sounded the death knell for emotional and subjective forms of  knowledge which
were increasingly considered to be ‘abnormal, dangerous, [and] half-animal’.24
The ontological dimensions of  crime – so personal and subjective – were increasingly
institutionalised and systematised. The depersonalisation of  these experiences occurred
via the filtering mechanism of  the ‘public interest’. In modernity, the problem of  criminal
wrongdoing became a rationalised domain of  action, a site which actively distrusted and
excluded ‘non-objective’ truth claims. The state, the law, the accused and the public
interest became the principal claims-makers within this institutional and normative
arrangement, an arrangement which would dominate criminal and penal relations for the
next 150 years. This newly established configuration suppressed the emotive and personal
elements of  crime (at least as far as the victim was concerned). It did so by denying
ownership claims to victims over the conflict and by removing any pathways which
permitted the possibility of  personal interest. ‘From now on’, as Nietzsche notes about
interpretation of  criminal wrongdoing in modernity, ‘the eye is trained for an increasingly
impersonal evaluation of  the deed, and this includes even the eye of  the injured party’.25
Facticity, objectivity, rationality, and neutrality – coalescing with the filtering fiction of  the
‘public interest’ – facilitated this drive from personal to institutional referents. Victims
were displaced, rendered neutral by the hegemonic impulses of  a state/accused logic of
action. They became non-subjects, disenfranchised and dispossessed of  all legal and
claims rights. They were no longer recognised (or recognisable) in the justice system, their
non-status and non-presence legitimate and legitimising features of  the modern
institutional process.
In addition, the focus of  criminal law moved to a more formalised conception of
criminal liability. Hierarchy, status, patronage, absolute sovereignty, and moral and
discretionary imperatives had no place under this rule of  law vista which advocated
certainty, permanency, coherency, systematic application and a ‘strictly professional legal
logic’:26 veritas non auctoritas facit legem (truth not authority makes law) became the driving
impulse. The private, personal and negotiable elements of  the exculpatory process were
thus increasingly dismantled by more bureaucratic, rational impulses.27 As Habermas
noted: ‘[t]he positivization, legalization, and formalization of  law meant that the validity
of  law can no longer feed off  the taken-for-granted authority of  moral traditions’.28
Instead, its validity would be based on the systematisation of  doctrinal propositions and
the emphasis on legal formalism and professional juridical input.29 The positivization and
densification of  law also helped to steer the conflict away from local and lay participation.
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The initial anchoring point of  this more rationalised approach to criminal law was the
‘reasonable man’, a responsible, rational, self-disciplining subject who, it was thought, was
capable of  being deterred by a properly proscribed system of  criminal laws and a tariff
of  enforced sanctions.30 This more codified approach to law also impacted on the image
of  the human subject who increasingly came to be constituted as a rational, autonomous
and self-governing being. This is brilliantly captured by Wiener who noted:31
The ideal of  the responsible individual came to stand ever more at the centre of
the law. Its administration was overhauled to better embody the assumption that
the members of  the general public were to be considered more rational and
responsible than they had been hitherto . . . A crucial supposition underlying
early Victorian law reform was that the most urgent need was to make people
self-governing and that the best way to do so was to hold them, sternly and
unblinkingly, responsible for the consequences of  their actions. Thus in the
course of  the early to mid-nineteenth century the accused was gradually
constructed as an abstract juridical subject who was free and equal, and capable
of  logically determining what was in his or her best interests. It was accordingly
his or her constitution – rather than situation – that became a key legal
battleground.
This drift towards the creation of  an asocial subject also had important consequences in
terms of  the penal disposal of  convicted offenders. In keeping with the ideology of
individualism, rationality and self-governance, judicial sentencing in the nineteenth
century increasingly embodied a policy of  deterrence and retribution, the former ‘to deny
the utility of  crime, the latter to reconstitute the social contract after breach.’32 The
discourse of  individualism and moralisation held that criminal acts – like actions in any
other realm where the ideology of  economic liberalism could permeate − were the
outcome of  rational choice, calculation and volition. Such an archetype of  sentencing is
premised on presumed rationality: ‘thus conceived, criminal law becomes a wholly
abstract construction, taking cognisance only of  the crime, while ignoring the criminal . . .
Crime becomes a legal abstraction, after the manner of  a geometrical construction or an
algebraic formula’.33 In effect, the system of  sentencing created in the mid-nineteenth
century focused on the materiality of  the crime ‘where the subjective criminality of  the
agent was determined by the objective criminality of  the deed’, and where the system of
disposal for the judiciary rested on ‘crystallised’ and mechanical punishments.34 David
Garland neatly encapsulated the asocial juridical framework which emerged in the
nineteenth century when he suggested:35
The offender is defined as a legal subject, a citizen inscribed with rights and
duties, entitled to equal treatment before the law. The State which punishes does
so by contractual right in accordance with the terms of  a political agreement. Its
power to punish has its source in the offender’s action – it is the agreed
consequences of  a contractual breach. The state has here no intrinsic or superior
right. It meets the citizen on terms of  equality and must not encroach upon his
or her rights, person or liberty except in circumstances which are rigorously and
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politically determined in advance – nulla poena sine lege. In this penal vision we
meet the ideology of  the minimal legal state, the liberal dream, guardian of  the
free market and the social contract.
In order to complete the modern picture, there is one further strand that must be traced
– the need to individuate justice. Sentencing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century gradually extricated itself  from the assumptions and commitments underpinning
mid nineteenth century sentencing practices (individualism, the rationality of  offenders
and a focus on the proximal conditions of  crime) to become a more ‘knowledgeable form
of  regulation’ (with an emphasis on individualisation, the distal conditions of  crime, and
the creation of  a plethora of  ‘non-equivalent’ penal disposals). Alongside the ‘generous’
– and mostly already won – procedural safeguards provided to the accused at investigation
and trial stages, a person guilty of  a crime became entitled at conviction stage to have his
or her individual mitigating circumstances factored into any decision about penal disposal.
Justice, it was reckoned, could not be satisfied by ‘any penalty which . . . [had] been exactly
fixed beforehand’; punishment, from now on, had to ‘be fitted to the criminal rather than
to the crime’.36 The all-powerful state had again decided to be generous and noble with
its weak enemies as it gradually recoiled from the laissez-faire individualism and the
postulate of  free will which had been key policy ingredients of  sentencing and the social
contract for much of  the nineteenth century. 
A state-accused logic of  action thus came to cast a long shadow over criminal process
relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It defined the accused as the primary
(exclusive) rights-bearer, with institutional practice heavily coordinated in accordance
with this feature. Criminal wrongdoing was increasingly reconstituted as a public matter
to be resolved almost exclusively through the prosecution process. Localism and
heterogeneity, elements cherished under the old order, were actively jettisoned under this
modern arrangement. This must be seen as part of  a drive to institutionalise interpersonal
conflicts, uncoupling them from everyday practices in lifeworld contexts. A state-accused
logic of  action came to constitute and demarcate the modern criminal process, mediating
all validity claims in respect of  the conflict. Criminal wrongdoing became a rationalised
domain of  action, measured in part by its capacity to filter out non-objective truth claims.
Victims who participated in the modern inculpatory process did so as legal subjects, with
little or no powers to make decisions about outcomes. 
The state could draw upon a centralised police force and a public prosecutor’s office
which would gather and present evidence in the public interest. As a consequence, in part,
of  this process of  state monopolisation, a discourse and practice of  liberal legalism
emerged (emphasising the universality, liberty and sameness of  the individual person) to
rebalance power relations in the justice arena. For the accused, this meant that the justice
network was restructured to incorporate a clearer and more substantive body of  due
process rights that would guarantee, as far as practicable, both substantive and procedural
justice. This ensured that the dynamic of  the courtroom altered so that the trial gaze re-
orientated itself  to focus almost exclusively on the prosecution case. Even when
convicted of  the crime, the offender was still protected from the state − exercising the
will of  the people − through the entitlement of  having a proportionate punishment
imposed, one that accorded both with the crime committed and, in time, any relevant
individual circumstances. 
The reification of  these state-accused relations had the effect of  excluding the victim,
his or her absentee status quickly acquiring a relative permanence, ‘fixity’ and
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immovability. His or her experiences were rooted exclusively through this new
institutional framework, ensuring that they were interpreted and understood around an
axis that focused on the state, the law, the public interest and the accused. The inculpatory
model of  justice that emerged zealously neutralised any emotive or personal dimensions
to the crime by distilling them into a single, rationally knowable, closed worldview – the
public interest. The victim increasingly therefore became a ‘non-person in a Kafka play’,37
unable to raise claims about the validity of  his or her ontological experiences within this
objectivated ‘public interest’. His or her voice was not heard − and was not capable of
being understood − given the commitments, value choices and governing principles of
this new institutional arrangement.
The re-emergence of the victim
In the last four decades, justice systems are partially being reconstructed again, as they
demonstrate an increased sensitivity to the needs and concerns of  victims of  crime. A
‘vision of  the victim as Everyman’ is part of  a ‘new cultural theme’,38 one which is widely
represented in social, political and media circles. It has been suggested that a number of
factors has facilitated this increased awareness of  victims in western criminal justice
systems.39 To begin with, the introduction of  state compensation programmes can be
viewed as an early attempt to move victims away from the periphery of  the criminal
process. In England and Wales, for example, Margaret Fry proposed a scheme of  state
compensation for the victims of  violence as early as 1957. In 1964, a Criminal Injuries
Compensation Scheme actually came into operation following the publication of  a White
Paper, Compensation for Victims of  Crimes of  Violence. Specific victimological studies became
more prominent and began to direct the criminological gaze away from its focus on
offenders, towards a typology of  victims’ experiences of  the wrongdoing.40 These
studies, among others, were important reference points in generating academic interest in
victims of  crime. This in turn helped to illuminate the intersectional nature of  crime,
moving the discourse on from conventional criminological accounts that framed and
explained the phenomenon exclusively through offender theories of  causation. They were
of  course followed up by the introduction of  mass victimisation surveys, commencing in
the 1970s in the US before also being employed in the early 1980s in the UK,41 which
among other things drew attention to the under-recording of  crime, repeat victimisation,
fear of  crime, and victims’ experiences with various criminal justice agencies such as the
police, prosecutors, trial judges, and other court personnel.42
In the Republic of  Ireland, studies such as that undertaken by Breen and Rottman,43
O’Connell and Whelan,44 and Watson45 all began to highlight the experiences of  victims.
They all helped to gather data on experiences of  crime and fear of  crime, providing
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insights quite different from institutional representations. However, mass crime
victimisation studies had a somewhat sluggish trajectory when compared with other
jurisdictions (commencing in the US in 1972 and the UK in 1982), hindered no doubt by
the absence of  a strong criminal justice research culture and successive governments’
dismissive attitude towards policy based on crime data and crime statistics.46
Notwithstanding such inertia, mass crime victimisation surveys did commence in 1998
with the introduction of  a crime segment into the Quarterly National Household Survey
(follow-up studies were conducted in 2003, 2006 and 2010). Since 2002, Garda public
attitude surveys have also been conducted (though they are not annual); they focus,
among other things, on the experiences and fears of  crime of  individuals. 
During the 1970s, the women’s movement also began to ‘conscious raise’ about female
victimisation, highlighting previously invisible and unvoiced social problems.47
Campaigning activists started to establish support networks such as Rape Crisis Centres
and Women’s Refuge Centres, whilst simultaneously drawing attention to the limitations
and challenges posed by an exclusively state/accused model of  criminal justice. More
specifically, increased self-activism also ensured that victims of  crime became more
visible again. The first domestic abuse shelter, for example, was established in 1974. The
first Rape Crisis Centre was set up in Dublin in 1977 and Derek Nally established Victim
Support in 1985.48 Service provision for victims of  crime in the Republic of  Ireland has
expanded in recent decades. The Victim’s Charter, for example, marked an important
policy development.49 This charter was produced by the Department of  Justice, Equality
and Law Reform in September 1999 (and was revised in 2010), reflecting the
‘commitment to giving victims of  crime a central place in the criminal justice system’. The
needs of  crime victims are also addressed by a wide variety of  victims’ organisations,
alliances and associations. Whilst a significant proportion are specialised in nature, dealing
with specific types of  victim or services, there are also some key national groups. 
Increasing concerns about rising crime rates in western countries from the 1970s
onwards, and the perceived failure of  correctionalist criminal justice projects to
rehabilitate offenders, have also had an impact. The noble post-war dream of  winning the
war on crime also began to fade in western countries from the 1970s onwards as the
nihilism of  ‘nothing works’ took hold.50 As crime became accepted as a normal social
phenomenon, discourse and practice moved away from an exclusive focus on normalising
the wrongdoer. A new emphasis on pragmatism was espoused, one which was agnostic as
regards the social or psychological causes of  deviancy. Instrumental reasoning of  this
kind accepts the normality of  crime and seeks strategies and practices to prevent or
displace it. The victim is much more central and visible under such a framework of
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understanding. Moreover, and in managing an incident, effective service provision to a
victim provides relatively quick, attractive and measurable outputs from criminal justice
agencies, at least when compared with more long-term and contingent results such as
convictions or successful rehabilitative outcomes. It is not surprising, according to
commentators such as Garland, that the ‘aim of  serving victims has become part of  the
redefined mission of  all criminal justice agencies’.51 Among other things, it has brought
into vogue the question: ‘What about the victim?’52
Moreover, the revelations brought about as a result of  inquiries over the last two
decades into Church sexual abuse and institutional abuse which occurred in the carceral
archipelago that emerged post-Independence – and the harrowing accounts of  the
‘endemic’ of  deaths, beatings, assaults, molestations, rapes, neglect and ritual humiliations
– is now very much part of  the Zeitgeist.53 Among other things, it has helped to raise
experiences of  victimhood in the collective conscience, and awareness of  illegitimate and
abusive hierarchies of  dominance. It was aggravated by the horrors of  brutal clerical
abuses in parishes in different parts of  the country. The flood of  delayed sexual offence
cases coming before the courts from the mid-1990s onwards cast further light on
institutions and clerics, but also on the dark dimensions of  abuse perpetrated on children
by family members, neighbours, teachers and so on.54 The horrific and tragic details of
this maelstrom of  abuse details – and the existential despair that it gave rise to – has
forced Irish society to confront widespread experiences of  victimhood.55
Events of  this kind were also covered by a media industry that was becoming more
specialised and instantaneous.56 It was also increasingly adept at individualising the
experiences of  victimhood through focused analysis and imagery. Aside from being
conscious-raising, these insights have also contributed to the development of  a healthy
scepticism of  institutions of  power, and any uncritical deference to such power. This has
been aided no doubt by repeated findings of  corrupt practices in political and executive
circles. This has, in part, contributed to a growing scepticism about the institutional
reification of  state functionaries such as the Office of  Director of  Public Prosecutions
and Gardaí.57 Given the demands for increased accountability and transparency in
decision-making structures, government agencies are no longer as free to set their own
imperatives, or to claim absolute immunity from scrutiny. Nor can they so easily defend
their actions on the basis of  the neutrality of  their activities, or hide behind a broad-based
appeal to public interest considerations or respect for institutions of  state power.
The legal system has also acted as a steerer of  reintegration. This is occurring through
the deliberative capacity of  domestic and EU legislatures, and through expansive judicial
interpretation of  constitutional and Convention texts. The emerging ‘rights revolution’ is
evident in both criminal and civil spheres, and it serves to open up the operational self-
enclosure that exists under a state-accused model of  justice. Juridification of  this kind is
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providing victims with a stronger legal status and permits their claims to be severed from
more public interest considerations. It will help to ensure that the intersubjective
dimensions of  the crime conflict are increasingly recognised. 
Considerations of  process fairness now include the victim within its conceptual
framework. Whilst previously such deliberations were housed within the more remote
medium of  the ‘public interest’, the courts are now becoming more explicit in specifically
identifying victims and competing rights. Of  course, the regulation of  victim experiences
in law necessarily involves a level of  abstraction and institutionalisation that never fully
captures all of  the relevant exigencies. Nevertheless, and despite these shortcomings,
increasing juridification of  the crime conflict, is helping to overcome the previous
ambivalence towards victims of  crime.
The European Convention on Human Rights is one example of  an influential
normative legal framework that seeks to extend the reach of  rights in the criminal process
to include victims of  crime. Though the Convention does not explicitly refer to victims
of  crime, the court has placed obligations on member states under Articles 2 (right to
life), 3 (degrading treatment), 6 (fair trial) and 8 (private life): to criminalise wrongdoing;
to take preventive operational measures; to protect society from potential dangers; to
provide appropriate civil remedies; to investigate and give reasons; and to adequately
protect victims and witnesses at various stages in the criminal process.58 A series of  other
obligations and safeguards have been interpreted through the provisions. They include,
for example, the requirement that states carry out effective investigations of  crime.
Effectiveness in this context requires public scrutiny to ensure accountability in practice;
an efficient and independent judicial system; the hierarchical and institutional
independence of  those responsible for the investigation of  a crime from those implicated
in the events; prompt responses by the authorities; the effective implementation of  court
orders to protect victims; and a legal and administrative framework that adequately
protects rights such as bodily integrity and privacy.59 Such interpretations help to identify
more concrete rights for victims of  crime, and act as a powerful counterpoint to the
hegemonic dominance of  state/accused relations.
Conclusion
The ‘axis of  individualisation’60 in the criminal justice process − which for so long was
directed only at offenders, the causes of  their wrongdoing (including ‘othering’) and their
right to protection from the state − has now bifurcated to embrace the multi-faceted
experiences of  victimhood. This of  course disturbs older, hegemonic ways of  doing
things (an accused/offender-organising logic that infused a police–public interest-
prosecutions-prisons model of  justice) and the reified, exclusive voices of  certain actors
that were central to that process (prosecution and defence lawyers, policing authorities,
and judges). Its recent emergence must be seen much more as a response to a previous
scandalous neglect, as a justified attempt to correct an imbalance in which the victim was
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constituted as a ‘silent abstraction, a background figure whose individuality hardly
registered’.61
Victims of  crime are again being recognised as a ‘community of  identity’.62 This
reshapes the construction and presentation of  intersubjective criminal conflict, not least
because pluralism of  this kind generates competing interests, priorities and validity claims
in the decision-making process. Momentum of  this kind makes it more difficult to rely
exclusively on tradition and previously settled conventions of  practice. The criminal
process is thus slowly moving from a monolithic culture of  rights to cultures of  rights
that reflect ‘multiple identities’ which are deserving of  concern and respect.63
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